Summary: In an attempt by the U.S. government's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to overthrow the premier of Cuba, Fidel Castro, a covert military operation--known as the Bay of Pigs invasion--was launched with the approval of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Feeling ever more uncomfortable with Castro's Communist regime, the CIA hoped to forestall communism's spread by taking over Cuba--in secret. Top-secret government planning created an army of Cuban exiles to "rebel" against Castro, organized a U.S.-based anti-Cuban group for the sole purpose of taking blame for the uprising, and orchestrated a huge anti-Castro propaganda campaign, including flyer distribution and mock radio stations to bolster anti-Castro sentiment. Over time, the Bay of Pigs operation grew too big for its proverbial britches, and became harder to keep under wraps. To make matters worse, the attack itself was a stunning failure, with the entire CIA-trained Cuban exile army captured or killed by Castro's army within the first few days. Promised American military support never showed up, and further plans to strike were scrapped almost immediately. The U.S. government prefers now to ignore Cuba, and adheres to a strict policy of isolationism.

Details: According to a top-secret Inspector General's report, made public in 1997, the objectives of the operation were: a) "Formation of a Cuban exile organization to attract Cuban loyalties, to direct opposition activities, and to provide cover for Agency operations"; b) "A propaganda offensive in the name of the opposition"; c) "Creation inside Cuba of a clandestine intelligence collection and action apparatus to be responsive to the direction of the exile organization"; and d) "Development outside Cuba of a small paramilitary force to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance groups."

The goal was to overthrow Castro's regime, keeping secret any U.S. involvement by operating without the knowledge of either Cubans or Americans. CIA operatives in Cuba posed as American businessmen, and Cuban exiles were used both to work from within Cuba without arising suspicion, and to parlay anti-Cuban sentiment within the United States. Howard Hunt, who would later be known as an undercover operative who conducted illegal break-ins under President Richard Nixon, headed up a separate group of Cuban exiles, stationed in Guatemala for military training. The actual invasion would appear to be a Cuban uprising. In fact, the CIA created a pseudo-coalition, the Cuban Revolutionary Council, to take responsibility for the "uprising."

The idea was to stop the rise of Castro's Communist regime, which was uncomfortably close to home for the U.S. Planning started in 1959, with the formation of a paramilitary group, loosely slated for use in Latin America, with Cuba only one potential target among many. On January 18, 1960, the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA formed a smaller branch, Branch Four, to handle operations in Cuba. Eisenhower approved formal plans for the Bay of Pigs operation, tacitly called "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime," on March 17. Propaganda pushing started early in 1960, with everything from a radio station posing as a public company (but actually backed by the government, purely for purposes of propaganda distribution) to anti-Castro comic books. Property was purchased and pseudo-companies were established to hide the CIA's actions.

Bay of Pigs proceeded, despite a severe budget overrun due to an unforeseen ballooning of personnel and equipment dedicated to the operation. In August 1960, President Eisenhower approved the final plans, broken into three separate phases: "The initial phase of paramilitary operations envisages the development, support and guidance of dissident groups in three areas of Cuba: Piper del Rio, Escambray and Sierra Maestra. These groups will be organized for concerted guerilla action against the regime. The second phase will be initiated by combined sea-air assault by Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD) forces on the Isle of Pines coordinated with general guerilla activity on the main island of Cuba. This will establish a close-in staging base for future operations. The last phase will be air assault on the Havana area with the guerilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground from these areas into the Havana area also."

The Bay of Pigs operation was officially underway on April 16, 1961. The ostensible public radio station, as well as other outlets serving government propaganda initiatives, upped their broadcasting time from around thirty hours per day total to around eighty. By this time, over 12 million pounds of leaflets had been dropped on Cuba. U.S. flights over Cuban airspace had been suspended, and all diplomatic relations with Cuba had been cut off. The CIA staged a "defection" of Cuban air force pilots, who would bomb Cuba on their way to the United States. The pilots' first run went smoothly, destroying about half of Castro's air force, but the controversy over the story surrounding the bombings that was ignited back in the U.S. led the CIA to call off further air strikes. Around 1500 other men comprised the Cuban exile brigade housed in Guatemala, including five infantry companies, one heavy weapons company, an intelligence-reconnaissance company, and one tank platoon. When they landed on the beaches in Cuba, they were crushed within a few days: Castro's forces bombed the militia's supply ships, and what troops they didn't kill, they captured. The attempt at an invasion left over 100 men dead, and over one thousand taken prisoner. Castro would later release the prisoners in exchange for $53 million worth of food and medicine from the United States.

What went wrong? On the surface, the invasion occurred smoothly and everyone did what they were supposed to do, but according to the Inspector General, the CIA failed to take several factors into account. What was initially a covert operation grew too large and complicated to stay concealed. The White House, now under President John F. Kennedy, was worried about the plausibility of denial, especially with the controversy over the initial air strikes. The Inspector General also held that the project was badly organized overall, without well-planned staffing or equipment assignments, and lacking a back-up plan. The factor of Soviet aid to Cuba, should it have been needed--and it would have certainly crushed a paltry group of 1,500 men--was also not considered by the CIA.

In the long run, the government came to the conclusion that the Bay of Pigs plan would never have succeeded in the form that it took. The U.S. policy of isolationism for Cuba, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, are both manifestations of the hostility that the Bay of Pigs caused. Despite its major propaganda campaign, the Bay of Pigs also gave Cubans an excuse to rally around Castro and turn against the United States.