series of events in imperial Russia that culminated in 1917, in the establishment of the Soviet state known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Actually, two revolutions are referred to as the Russian Revolution. The first, which began with the revolt of March 8–12, 1917 (February 23–27 in the Julian, or Old Style, calendar, then in use in Russia), overthrew the autocratic imperial monarchy; it is frequently called the February, or March, Revolution. The second, which opened with the armed insurrection of November 6–7 (October 24–25), organized by the Bolshevik party against the provisional government, effected a change in all economic, political, and social relationships in Russian society; it is often designated the Bolshevik, or October, Revolution. (The Gregorian calendar was adopted by the Soviet government on Jan. 31, 1918; therefore, all further references to dates in this article are made in accordance with the new calendar.)

The March Revolution.

The immediate cause of the March Revolution of 1917 was the collapse of the czarist regime under the gigantic strain of World War I. The underlying cause was the backward economic condition of the country, which made it unable to sustain the war effort against powerful, industrialized Germany. Russian manpower was virtually inexhaustible. Russian industry, however, lacked the capacity to arm, equip, and supply the some 15 million men who were put into the field. Factories were few and insufficiently productive, and the railroad network was inadequate. Repeated mobilizations, moreover, disrupted industrial and agricultural production. The food supply decreased, and the transportation system became disorganized. In the trenches, the soldiers went hungry and frequently lacked shoes or munitions, sometimes even weapons. Russian casualties were greater than those sustained by any army in any previous war. Behind the front, goods became scarce, prices skyrocketed, and by 1917 famine threatened the larger cities. Discontent became rife, and the morale of the army suffered, finally to be undermined by a succession of military defeats. These reverses were attributed by many to the alleged treachery of Empress Alexandra (1872–1918), and her circle, in which the peasant monk Rasputin was the dominant influence. When the Duma (parliament) protested against the inefficient conduct of the war and the arbitrary policies of the imperial government, the czar and his ministers simply brushed it aside.

Mounting crisis.

At first all parties except a small group within the Social Democratic party supported the war. The government received much aid in the war effort from voluntary committees, including representatives of business and labor. The growing breakdown of supply, made worse by the almost complete isolation of Russia from its prewar markets, was felt especially in the major cities, which were flooded with refugees from the front. Despite an outward calm, many Duma leaders felt that Russia would soon be confronted with a new revolutionary crisis. By 1915 the liberal parties had formed a progressive bloc, which gained a majority in the Duma.

As the tide of discontent mounted, the Duma warned Emperor Nicholas II in November 1916 that disaster would overtake the country unless the “dark,” or treasonable, elements were removed from the court and a constitutional form of government was instituted. The emperor ignored the warning. Late in December a group of aristocrats, led by Prince Feliks Yusupov (1887–1967), assassinated Rasputin in the hope that the emperor would then change his course. He responded by showing favor to Rasputin’s followers at court. Talk of a palace revolution in order to avert a greater impending upheaval became widespread, especially among the upper ranks.

Strikes and demonstrations.

The Revolution of 1917 grew out of a mounting wave of food and wage strikes in Petrograd (now Saint Petersburg) during February. On March 8 meetings and demonstrations in which the principal slogan was a demand for bread were held, supported by the 90,000 men and women on strike in the national capital. Encounters with the police were numerous; the workers refused to disperse and continued to occupy the streets; tension steadily increased but no casualties resulted.

Agitation grew the following day, March 9, until it involved about half the workers of Petrograd. The slogans now were bolder: “Down with the war!” “Down with autocracy!” On March 10 the strike became general throughout the capital. During these two days violent encounters took place with the police, with casualties on both sides. The dreaded cossack troops, however, which had been called out to support the police, showed little enthusiasm for breaking up the demonstrations. The workers captured several police stations, seized the small arms inside, and then burned the stations to the ground; the police went into hiding. The first elections to a Petrograd Soviet, or Council, of Workers’ Deputies were held in several factories, on the model of the Soviet of 1905, which had been formed during a revolution at the end of the Russo-Japanese War.

Confrontation with troops.

On March 11 the troops of the Petrograd garrison were called out to suppress the uprising. When the workers and soldiers came face to face in the streets, the workers tried to fraternize with the soldiers. In some of these encounters the troops were hostile and, on orders, fired, killing a number of workers. The workers fled, but did not abandon the streets. As soon as the firing ceased, they returned to confront the soldiers again. In subsequent encounters the troops wavered when ordered to fire, allowing the workers to pass through their lines. Nicholas dissolved the Duma; the deputies accepted the decree but reassembled privately and elected a provisional committee of the state duma to act in its place. On March 12 the Revolution triumphed. Regiment after regiment of the Petrograd garrison went over to the people. Within 24 hours the entire garrison, approximately 150,000 men, joined the Revolution, and the united workers and soldiers became the masters of the capital. The uprising claimed about 1500 victims.

The Petrograd Soviet.

The imperial government was quickly dispersed. Effective political power subsequently was exercised by two new bodies, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and a provisional government formed by the provisional committee of the Duma. The Soviet, a representative body of elected deputies, immediately appointed a commission to cope with the problem of ensuring a food supply for the capital, placed detachments of revolutionary soldiers in the government offices, and ordered the release of thousands of political prisoners. On March 13 the Soviet ordered the arrest of Nicholas’s ministers and began publishing an official organ, Izvestia (News). On March 14 it issued its famous Order No. 1. By the terms of this order, the soldiers of the army and the sailors of the fleet were to submit to the authority of the Soviet and its committees in all political matters; they were to obey only those orders that did not conflict with the directives of the Soviet; they were to elect committees that would exercise exclusive control over all weapons; on duty, they were to observe strict military discipline, but harsh and contemptuous treatment by the officers was forbidden; disputes between soldiers’ committees and officers were to be referred to the Soviet for disposition; off duty, soldiers and sailors were to enjoy full civil and political rights; and saluting of officers was abolished. Subsequent efforts by the Soviet to limit and nullify its own Order No. 1 were unavailing, and it continued in force.

The Petrograd Soviet easily could have assumed complete power in the capital, but it failed to do so. The great majority of its members, believing that revolutionary Russia must wage a war of defense against German imperialism, did not want to risk disorganizing the war effort. Taken by surprise like all parties by the outbreak of the Revolution, the working-class parties were unable to give the workers and soldiers in the Soviet strong political leadership. Even the Bolsheviks, who, in a sense, had been preparing for the Revolution since 1905, had been unaware of its imminence and had no program to take advantage of the situation. Not until the return to Russia of their leader, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, on April 16, did the Bolsheviks put forward a demand for immediate seizure of land by the peasantry, establishment of workers’ control in industry, an end to the war, and transfer of “all power to the Soviets.” In the Petrograd Soviet, however, the Bolsheviks were then a small minority. The majority was composed of Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. The Mensheviks envisioned a period of capitalist development and complete political democracy as the essential prerequisite for a socialist order; in the main, they supported continuation of the war. Most of the leading Socialist Revolutionaries, a peasant party with vague socialist aspirations, also advocated continuation of the war. Under the leadership of the moderate majority, the Petrograd Soviet recognized the newly established provisional government as the legal authority in Russia.

The Provisional Government.

On March 12, the provisional committee of the Duma announced that it would handle restoration of order, and on March 13 it placed its representatives, or commissars, in charge of the ministries. The provisional committee formed a provisional government and demanded the abdication of the czar. Nicholas abdicated March 15 in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich (1878–1918). The latter, however, stipulated that he would accept the crown only at the request of a future constituent assembly. The provisional government, except for the addition of the socialist leader Aleksandr Fyodorovich Kerensky, was made up of the same liberal leaders who had organized the progressive bloc in the Duma in 1915. The prime minister, Prince Georgy Yevgenyevich Lvov, was a wealthy landowner and a member of the Constitutional Democratic (or Cadet) party, which favored an immediate constitutional monarchy and ultimately a republic. Lvov was largely a figurehead; the outstanding personality in the government was Pavel Milyukov (1859–1943), minister of foreign affairs and strongest leader of the Cadet party since its founding in 1905. He played the principal role in formulating policy. Kerensky, the minister of justice, who had been leader of the Trudovik (“laborite”) faction in the Duma, was the only representative of moderate socialist opinion in the provisional government.

Spread of the Revolution.

After the success in Petrograd the Revolution spread throughout the country. Following the same basic course as it had in the capital, it resulted also in the creation of two parallel systems of government, in which soviets functioned side by side with authorities who were in communication with the provisional government.

Recognized by the Petrograd Soviet and by the command of the army and navy, the provisional government enjoyed widespread popularity at first. It disbanded the czarist police, repealed all limitations on freedom of opinion, press, and association, and put an end to all laws discriminating against national or religious groups. It also recognized the right of Poland to be a free and independent state; but it had no firm basis of authority. The Duma, from which it derived, could give no support, for that body was not genuinely representative of the masses. Unable to command, the government could not appeal to a war-weary, impatient people. Its plight was succinctly summed up by the minister of war, Aleksandr Guchkov (1861?–1936): “The government, alas, has no real power; the troops, the railroads, the post, and telegraph are in the hands of the Soviet. The simple fact is that the provisional government exists only so long as the Soviet permits it.”

Postponement of decisions.

With respect to crucial social problems, the provisional government claimed that, being provisional, it could not make fundamental changes such as confiscating land and distributing it to the peasants. All basic changes had to be postponed for decision by a constituent assembly, but the election of such an assembly was put off on the ground that a large part of the country was under enemy occupation. Actually, the liberals of the provisional government realized that power in the constituent assembly would pass from their hands to the various socialist parties, and that their only hope of retaining it was to wait for an Allied victory in the war.

War or Peace.

The provisional government split with the Petrograd Soviet on the question of war aims. On March 19 the provisional government pledged itself to continue the war until victory was won and to “unswervingly carry out the agreements made with our allies.” Milyukov previously had informed the provisional government that these agreements included secret treaties providing for the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia and the annexation of other territory. The Petrograd Soviet disclaimed all demands for annexations and reparations and called upon the peoples of the warring countries to force their governments to negotiate peace. The Soviet condemned Milyukov’s pledge, and although the two bodies found a vague compromise, the conflict was not resolved during the existence of the provisional government. Not even the Soviet was fully aware then of the widespread unwillingness of the Russian people to continue the war.

The eight months following the formation of the provisional government were marked by antagonism between the government and the Petrograd Soviet that eventually grew to open conflict. Essential in this development was the political transformation of the soviets, from institutions supporting parliamentary democracy into instruments for revolutionary socialism. Two principal causes of this transformation may be distinguished. The first was the government’s policy of postponing for future determination by a constituent assembly the solution of such pressing problems as economic disorganization, the continued food crisis, industrial reforms, redistribution of land to peasants, and the growth of counterrevolutionary forces. The government, instead, devoted most of its energy to a continuation of the war. The second cause, a logical consequence of the first, was the growing conviction of the workers and peasants that their problems could be solved only by the soviets, a conviction that was decisively molded by Bolshevik propaganda following the mid-April arrival in Petrograd of Lenin.

Before Lenin’s return from exile, Bolshevik policy had been formulated by such leaders as Lev Kamenev (1883–1936) and Joseph Stalin, who favored conditional support of the provisional government and were in the process of making a political bloc with the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. At the All-Russian Conference of Bolshevik Party Workers, convened in Petrograd on April 11, the only speaker who advocated seizure of power by the Bolsheviks and establishment of a proletarian dictatorship was ruled out of order. The conference did consider the question of unification with the Mensheviks, a process already taking place in the provinces in consequence of the moderate political program of the Bolshevik leaders.

Growth of Bolshevik Influence.

Lenin arrived in Petrograd during the All-Russian Conference of Bolshevik Party Workers. In his first address to the delegates, he advocated uncompromising opposition to the war and the provisional government and irreconcilable hostility toward all supporters of both; he proposed that the party struggle for the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship. At the same time he declared that the Bolsheviks, who were a small minority, confronted a task, not of the immediate seizure of power, but of patient propaganda to convince a majority of the workers of the soundness of Bolshevik policy. Opposed at first by virtually the entire Bolshevik leadership, Lenin quickly succeeded in converting the party to his course. Bolshevik policy was thereafter directed toward the assumption of full power by the soviets, immediate termination of the war, planned and organized seizure of the land by the peasants, and control by the workers of industrial production. Bolshevik propaganda themes were exemplified in the slogans “Peace, Land, Bread” and “All Power to the Soviets.” The exiled revolutionary Leon Trotsky arrived in Petrograd in the middle of May from America. He agreed with Lenin’s policy and joined the Bolshevik party.

Developments favored the Bolshevik cause. On May 1 Milyukov sent a note to the Allied governments, promising to continue the war to a victorious conclusion; in ambiguous language, the note also pledged his support of the provisional government to a policy of annexing foreign territory and imposing indemnities on defeated nations. This pronouncement, in sharp contrast with the earlier declaration “to the people of the whole world” issued by the Petrograd Soviet on March 27 calling for peace without annexations and indemnities, provoked armed demonstrations of protest by workers and soldiers in the capital. Contrary to the proposal of Gen. Lavr Kornilov to quell the demonstrations by force, the Petrograd Soviet, which assumed sole command of the garrison of the capital, ordered all troops to remain in their barracks. As a result of the political crisis, Milyukov and Guchkov resigned, and the government was reorganized on May 18 to include representatives of the socialist parties, which received 6 of the 15 portfolios; Kerensky became minister of war.

First Congress of Soviets.

The crisis stimulated considerable growth in the Bolshevik party, but it still held only a minority of the delegates to the first all-Russian Congress of Soviets, which convened in Petrograd on June 16. The Congress was dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. The coalition government, meanwhile, had taken office amid a deepening economic and social crisis. Failure to provide the cities with grain aggravated the danger of famine, and inflation and suffering rapidly increased. In industry, the growing power of the workers induced economic defeatism and lockouts on the part of employers. The more conservative groups demanded that the government adopt a strong policy and call a halt to the revolution. The workers responded with economic and political strikes and with demands that the government institute measures to cope with the crisis. The Congress of Soviets, which supported the government, declared in favor of state monopolies of bread and other necessary items. The government, however, like its predecessor, subordinated all problems to the prosecution of the war. On June 29 Kerensky ordered an offensive that ended in a complete defeat and the virtual disorganization of the army—all of which added credibility to Bolshevik propaganda. Discipline broke down, and millions of soldiers streamed home from the front to escape further fighting and to take part in the division of the land.

The July uprising.

During the ill-fated offensive, the opposition by workers and soldiers in Petrograd to a renewal of military hostilities forced the Congress of Soviets to adopt a resolution calling for the abolition of the Duma, that is, the political base of the provisional government, and setting September 30 as the date for the convocation of a constituent assembly. A mammoth demonstration of about 400,000 Petrograd workers, organized by the Congress of Soviets during the offensive, unexpectedly revealed that the Bolshevik influence was very strong in the working class of the capital; the prevailing slogans in the demonstrations were “Down with the Offensive” and again “All Power to the Soviets.” On July 16, 17, and 18, this mounting impatience, perhaps quickened by the resignation of the Cadet ministers over the issue of Ukrainian autonomy, was expressed in an impromptu armed demonstration of 500,000 workers, soldiers of the city garrison, and sailors of the nearby naval fortress of Kronstadt. The demonstrators denounced the government and converged on the Tauride Palace, where the Congress of Soviets was in session, to force it to assume sole power.

Bolshevik leadership.

Caught by surprise, the Bolshevik leadership at first attempted to restrain the masses, but when that proved impossible, the party openly placed itself at the head of the movement, with the declared intention of keeping the demonstration peaceful. In this, the Bolsheviks were largely successful. Their policy was motivated by the consideration that they could have seized power easily in the capital but could not have held it in the rest of the country without support by a majority of the soldiers at the front and of the peasants in the provinces. The executive committee of the Congress denounced the demonstration as a counterrevolutionary Bolshevik insurrection and summoned troops from the front to disperse the demonstrators. The troops, arriving on July 18, when the demonstration had run its course, placed themselves at the disposition solely of the Congress of Soviets, in effect recognizing it as the supreme governing authority in the country. On July 10 Kerensky succeeded Lvov as prime minister, and on August 6 a second coalition government, including the Socialist and Cadet wings, was formed, with Kerensky and his political friends holding the decisive posts.

The Kerensky Government.

The July demonstration produced a wave of political reaction. Some land committees were dissolved by the government; the death penalty, abolished during the first days of the Revolution, was restored in the fighting zones although not enforced; and the convocation of the constituent assembly was postponed to the end of November. Forceful methods were employed against the Bolsheviks. Lenin was denounced as a paid agent of German imperialism and went into hiding in Finland; Trotsky and others were arrested. Nonetheless, the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik party opened in Petrograd on August 6, despite the absence of some of its leaders.

Because the Kerensky government took no effective steps to overcome the steadily deteriorating economic situation, unrest continued in the cities and countryside, and Bolshevik influence again began to increase. Convinced that Kerensky could not cope with the situation, some Cadet elements and the general staff, led by the newly appointed commander in chief, Kornilov, decided to bring loyal troops to Petrograd and establish a military dictatorship. For a time, Kerensky was a party to the conspiracy, but when he learned that Kornilov proposed to remove him from the government, he appealed to the Petrograd Soviet for support.

While Kornilov’s forces advanced on the capital, the workers’ and soldiers’ militia prepared to defend it. With the approval of the Congress of Soviets, military organizations were established throughout the city, and the boldness and initiative of the Bolsheviks in these bodies made them the leaders of the defense. The railroad workers refused to transport Kornilov’s force. As the troops advanced on foot, they encountered the soldiers and workers of the capital, who came out of the city to meet them with appeals to fraternize. Kornilov’s army dissolved before it reached the capital; he himself was arrested on September 14. These events left the workers of Petrograd organized and armed. Now, for the first time, the Bolsheviks secured a majority in the Petrograd Soviet.

After Kornilov’s defeat the provisional government was virtually powerless. Under growing Bolshevik pressure the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee decided on the election of a new Congress of Soviets to convene on November 2; later, it was postponed to November 7. A Bolshevik majority in the new Congress was assured by the rising tide of support for Lenin’s party among the soldiers and workers. Fears that the new political alignment would result in the creation of a Bolshevik government spurred Kerensky to make a half-hearted attempt to send some troops from the Petrograd garrison to the front. On October 29 the Petrograd Soviet created the Military Revolutionary Committee for the defense of the capital against the counterrevolution; on this committee the Bolsheviks obtained a commanding majority, and the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries there-upon refused to participate.

The November Revolution.

Foreseeing the course of events, Lenin, from about the end of September, pressed the central committee of the Bolshevik party to organize an armed insurrection and seize power. After some resistance, the committee on October 23 approved Lenin’s policy. It is generally believed that the insurrection was planned by the military organization of the party to coincide with the opening of the second Congress of Soviets. It was carried out during the night of November 6–7 and the following day by the Military Revolutionary Committee under the direction of Trotsky. Armed workers, soldiers, and sailors stormed the Winter Palace, head-quarters of the provisional government. Although the seizure of power involved tens of thousands of men and women, it was virtually bloodless. On the afternoon of November 7, Trotsky announced the end of the provisional government. Several of its ministers were arrested later that day; Kerensky escaped and subsequently went into exile.

On November 7, while the insurrection was in progress, the second Congress of Soviets began its deliberation. Of the 650 delegates, representing local soviets, 390 (60 percent) were Bolsheviks. The opening session, its speeches punctuated by rifle fire in the streets, was the scene of a stormy debate over the legality of the Congress and the character of the insurrection. Most of the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary delegates withdrew from the Congress, which continuously received declarations of support from workers’ organizations and military groups; the left wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries remained in the Congress and formed a short-lived coalition government with the Bolsheviks.

Second Congress of Soviets.

Making his first appearance at the Congress on November 8, Lenin struck the keynote of its further deliberations with his opening declaration: “We shall now proceed to the construction of the socialist order.” The Congress then took up the three crucial issues of peace, land, and the constitution of a new government. It unanimously adopted a manifesto appealing to “all warring peoples and their governments to open immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace.” To that end the manifesto proposed an immediate armistice for a minimum of three months.

Ratification of principles.

Decisions on the land question were made in the form of a decree: “The right to private property in the land is annulled forever. . . . The landlord’s property in the land is annulled immediately and without any indemnity whatever. . . .” All landed estates and the holdings of monasteries and churches were made national property and were placed under the protection of local land committees and soviets of peasants. The holdings of poor peasants and of the rank and file of the cossacks, however, were specifically exempted from confiscation. Hired labor on the land was prohibited, and the right of all citizens to cultivate land by their own labor was affirmed. The Congress laid down the principle that “the use of the land must be equalized, that is, the land is to be divided among the toilers according to local conditions on the basis of standards either of labor or consumption.” Since most of these principles had already been put into practice by the Bolsheviks, however, the decrees were in effect a ratification of an accomplished fact rather than a new change.

New government.

The Congress provided for a governmental structure in which supreme authority was vested in the Congress of Soviets. Execution of the decisions of the Congress was entrusted to the Soviet or Council of People’s Commissars, which was made subject to the authority of the Congress of Soviets and to its Central Executive Committee. Each of the people’s commissars was the chairman of a commission or commissariat, corresponding to the ministries of other governments. Lenin was elected head of the Council of People’s Commissars. Among other leading Bolsheviks elected to the Council were Trotsky and Stalin. With the establishment of the new government, the Congress adjourned.

The decisions of the Congress on peace and land evoked widespread support for the new government, and they were decisive in assuring victory to the Bolsheviks in other cities and in the provinces. The Council of People’s Commissars, on November 15, also proclaimed the right of self-determination, including voluntary separation from Russia of the nationalities forcibly included in the czarist empire, but made it clear that it hoped that the “toiling masses” of the various nationalities would decide to remain with Russia. It also nationalized all banks and proclaimed the workers’ control of production. Industry was nationalized gradually. The freely elected constituent assembly, which convened in Petrograd in January 1918, and in which the Bolsheviks were only a small minority, was dispersed with armed force by the newly formed government.        P.E.M., PHILIP E. MOSLEY, M.A., Ph.D., LL.D.

See also BOLSHEVISM,; COMMUNISM,; SOCIALISM,; UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

For further information on this topic, see the Bibliography, section 975. Russian Revolution.