Nixon’s Plan to End the War
When President Richard Nixon took office in January 1969, the U.S. had been sending combat troops to fight in Vietnam since 1965, and some 31,000 American lives had been lost. However, the full-scale U.S. military commitment seemingly had made little progress in defeating North Vietnam and its Viet Cong guerilla allies. The enemy forces had absorbed tremendous punishment but remained determined to overthrow the U.S.-supported government of South Vietnam and reunite the country under Communist rule.
Facing intense pressure from a frustrated and war-weary public, Nixon sought a way to disengage American combat forces without appearing to abandon South Vietnam to the Communists. He rejected calls from the anti-war movement to order an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops and publicly expressed a desire to achieve “peace with honor” in Vietnam.
Toward this end, Nixon and his advisors developed a new strategy they called Vietnamization. U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (1922-) first used the term in March 1969, following a visit to South Vietnam. The Nixon administration’s Vietnamization plan provided for a gradual, phased withdrawal of American combat forces, combined with an expanded effort to train and equip South Vietnam to take over military responsibility for its own defense.
The president announced his Vietnamization strategy to the American people in a nationally televised speech on November 3, 1969. He emphasized how his approach contrasted with the “Americanization” of the war that had taken place under his predecessor, President Lyndon Johnson (1908-73). “The defense of freedom is everybody’s business, not just America’s business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened,” Nixon explained. “In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.”
In addition to U.S. troop withdrawals and efforts to prepare and modernize the South Vietnamese army, Nixon’s Vietnamization strategy also featured programs designed to strengthen the South Vietnamese government and expand its political base in rural areas. He offered U.S. assistance to help South Vietnamese officials organize local elections and implement social reforms and economic development initiatives.
At the same time that the Vietnamization plan was put in place, however, the Nixon administration also escalated U.S. military activity in other parts of Southeast Asia. In April 1970, for example, the president secretly authorized bombing campaigns and a ground invasion of neutral Cambodia. When his expansion of the war came to public attention, Nixon asserted that the incursion into Cambodia was necessary to keep pressure on the enemy until the Vietnamization strategy took root. The president’s actions nonetheless came under harsh criticism and prompted massive anti-war demonstrations across America.
Nixon gradually reduced the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam in several stages, from a peak of 549,000 in 1969 to 69,000 in 1972. However, during this same period, North Vietnamese leaders launched several offensives that tested the president’s resolve and cast doubt on his Vietnamization strategy. The March 1972 Easter Offensive, for instance, highlighted the poor performance of the South Vietnamese army and its heavy reliance on U.S. air power to repel the Communist attack.
Effectiveness of Vietnamization
In January 1973, the Nixon administration negotiated a peace agreement with North Vietnamese leaders. Under the terms of the settlement, the U.S. agreed to withdraw its remaining troops within 60 days in exchange for an immediate cease-fire, the return of American prisoners of war, and North Vietnam’s promise to recognize the legitimacy of South Vietnam’s government and submit future disputes to an international commission.
In his final report before leaving office that month, Laird declared the Vietnamization process completed: “As a consequence of the success of the military aspects of Vietnamization, the South Vietnamese people today, in my view, are fully capable of providing for their own in-country security against the North Vietnamese.” However, later events proved that the secretary of defense’s confidence was unfounded, as South Vietnam fell to the Communist forces in 1975.