Why the U.S. Banking System Faced Repeated Panics Before 1907
Before the early 20th century, the U.S. banking system was a patchwork of private banks called trust companies. No central authority existed to coordinate them.
That wasn’t an accident—it reflected a deep and longstanding suspicion of centralized financial power. “A lot of the Founding Fathers really feared giving either the biggest bankers in the U.S. or politicians in Washington control over interest rates,” says Gary Richardson, a professor of economics at the University of California, Irvine, who served as the Federal Reserve’s historian from 2012 to 2016.
Problem was, trust companies, which were lightly regulated, failed often; and without a central authority to steady the system, panics became routine. Between 1865 and 1913, the U.S. suffered at least five major financial crises. One big reason: The money supply was capped. Banknotes were backed by U.S. government bonds and tied to gold and silver reserves. And the amount of currency in circulation could only be changed by an act of Congress—a slow, political process, says Richardson.
This rigid system clashed with the needs of the country. Every fall, when farmers, who made up the bulk of the population, flooded the market with crops, they used the proceeds to pay workers and settle debts. The high seasonal demand for cash routinely spiked interest rates—and fostered instability.
How a Failed Copper Scheme Triggered the Panic of 1907
For that reason, bank runs often struck in the fall. But in 1907, fresh shocks turned routine autumn jitters into full-blown panic. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake and the 1900 Galveston hurricane in Texas had forced insurance companies to raise enormous amounts of cash to pay claims, draining reserves.
Then came a spectacular gamble. A group of New York millionaires tried to corner the market for United Copper stock, betting that soaring demand for the material—driven by America’s electrification—would make them rich. They borrowed heavily, bought up shares and prepared to cash in. Instead, the scheme collapsed. Loans weren't repaid. Panic spread.
J.P. Morgan’s Last-Minute Rescue in His Library
But while financial panics weren’t new in the U.S., “there was really nothing the federal government could do to step in during these periods,” says Richardson. In such moments, the task of saving the system often fell to influential private financiers.
In 1907, that meant J.P. Morgan, the financial titan who started the bank that still holds his name. At 70, he became a one-man de facto central bank, summoning bank leaders to his private library on Madison Avenue in Manhattan. He ordered them to open their books, locked the doors and refused to let anyone leave until they pledged millions to keep the system afloat, according to Colin B. Bailey, director of The Morgan Library. He even enlisted Treasury officials to bolster confidence.
His dramatic intervention restored short-term confidence. But it also exposed a troubling truth: The U.S. financial system rested not on public authority but on the will and judgment of a few powerful men.